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INTRODUCTION

Our study of the bankruptcy process provides the occasion to consider
again the role that the state should play in adjusting relationships which have
their origin in private contract. One cannot venture too far into this subject
before encountering substantial controversy. The range of philosophical viewpoints does not suffer from a lack of contrast. Some would regard government intrusions into the area of private contract as a transgression of the
highest order. Others would contend that many of the relationships affected
by government action-such as those in consumer bankruptcy cases---cannot
be characterized as contractual in the traditional sense.' This group regards
the defense of the "sanctity of contract" as beside the point and would urge
that our main concern should be with the role of the state in protecting its
citizens from overreaching by creditors.
There is much that remains to be added to our understanding of the role
of private contracts in a modern credit society. It will not, however, be found
in the pages of this commentary. My purpose is the much less ambitious one
of attempting to identify what ought to be the area of debate as we examine
the process of bankruptcy. While I conclude that Dean Meckling's paper has
headed us in the right direction, there are some additional notions that warrant attention.
I
WHY BANKRUPTCY?

Before considering the question of the costs of bankruptcy reform, it may
be useful to examine some other, preliminary matters. First, I think it is important that we identify where we are in the constitutional (small c) process
of bankruptcy. Are we asking whether we should have a bankruptcy system at
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all, or are we attempting to define the degree of relief that the system should
afford? While I believe the answer is clear-we are addressing the second
issue-it is worthwhile to consider the reasons for our lack of concern about
the threshold question, Why bankruptcy?
I would suggest that in structuring the legal system for debtor-creditor
relationships in our society, most of us would favor the establishment of a
formal system for the collective settlement of the obligations of overburdened
debtors. And after we consider the various alternative arrangements that
might be devised, we would likely conclude that the state should play a central
role in the administration of the system. This would be our conclusion, I believe, whether we were voting as debtors or as creditors, or from a more
disinterested perspective. For the moment we should leave aside the question
whether our system would allow the debtor to be discharged from his debts
with something less than full satisfaction of the obligations. A discharge is
not an inseparable part of bankruptcy, as evidenced by the fact that the bankruptcy systems of many Euopean countries operate without it. In the absence of a discharge we would use our system to arrange for the extension
of debts and perhaps to facilitate voluntary compromises of creditors' claims.
A creditor evaluating bankruptcy systems would likely concede that the
government should have a role in this process because private contracts provide an ineffective vehicle for the protection of their interests. Dean Meckling
has given us a basic contractual model for debt arrangements, an agreement
between B (borrower) and L (lender).2 But the world in which this contract
arises also includes other parties who may affect the relationship: T1i, T2, and
other third-party creditors. I think we will conclude that it is extremely
difficult-to the point of being impractical-for L to use his contract with B to
insure that he will be repaid by B. Even if we limit our inquiry to defaults
caused by financial mismanagement, we can identify restraints that will operate on L. After contracting with L, B remains free to increase significantly the
risk of his default by entering into agreements with T 1 , T2, and others. L
might include in the contract a term prohibiting B from assuming further
debt or requiring L's prior approval of new obligations, but these devices
would not invalidate unauthorized contracts with third parties, and in many
cases the costs of truly effective policing would be prohibitive. Moreover, as a
practical matter, L would not want to be B's sole creditor. B's credit needs will
require many different types of loans, from a long-term home mortgage to
short-term credits for consumer goods and services. L is not likely to be organized to handle all of these and, in addition, may have doubts about the
wisdom of excluding B from other credit sources. Thus, L can anticipate that
2.
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B will have other debts which affect his ability to repay L but which cannot be
controlled by L's contract.
Another consideration that will influence our creditor's vote is the fact that
there is no principle of justice that prohibits a debtor from favoring one unsecured creditor over another when using limited current assets to satisfy outstanding debts. If the debtor has only $500 remaining, he may use it to satisfy
the claim of one creditor, and ignore the commitments he has made to others.
Since such preferences are not proscribed in the nonbankruptcy world, all
creditors are likely to be concerned about how they will fare when the
debtor's affairs deteriorate to the point at which collection actions begin. The
process of enforcing their contracts through private lawsuits holds a substantial risk that much may be ventured but little gained. A creditor may initiate a
collection action and secure a judgment only to find that another creditor has
already consumed all available assets by a prior judgment, private arrangement with the debtor, or otherwise.
If he were asked to vote on proposals for a bankruptcy system, a creditor
is unlikely to know how he will fare in the collection race that will be precipitated by the defaults of his future debtors. He will not know whether he will
be among those creditors who, through superior knowledge or superior legal
counsel, are able to receive preferential treatment. Thus, the creditor may
well conclude that he should vote for a system that assures him of equal participation in the distribution of the debtor's estate. And since the institution of
private contract cannot guarantee this result, he is likely to elect to have the
state administer a system that requires the participation of all creditors.
Others may support the establishment of a bankruptcy system on efficiency grounds. A system that is properly structured and administered would
avoid many of the inefficiencies that result when creditors are left to their
separate collection remedies. If creditors were left to their individual remedies, certain questions would appear in every creditor's lawsuit. These include questions about the extent and location of the debtor's assets, the
existence of priority liens, and the propriety of the debtor's conduct with his
estate. Rather than investigate these questions anew in every suit, it is preferable to have a single inquiry, accompanied by provisions for a single administration and distribution. Since some coercion may be necessary to exact
truthful answers and since an impartial decisionmaker is important, state control seems appropriate. When this arrangement for a common adjudication is
coupled with a rule providing for an equitable distribution of assets, creditors
will find that they are able to avoid situations in which, because of imperfect
information, they incur significant litigation costs only to find that their
judgments are of little value.
Our constitutional debate is likely to heat up somewhat when we turn our
attention to the question whether we should permit a court-ordered discharge
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of certain debts. It is one thing to authorize the government to intervene to
facilitate plans for the extension and voluntary compromise of obligations; it
may be quite another matter to force the creditor to accept less than complete
satisfaction. We can approach the issue as being whether such a compulsory
settlement involving less than the full obligations should ever be required,
leaving until later the question which debts should be dischargeable.
The arguments against permitting discharge are likely to have a decided
philosophical overtone. Granting discharges may erode the degree of responsibility with which the debtor approaches his affairs and may lessen his incentive to avoid overextension. To the extent that we remove the penalty for
insolvency we may actually nudge debtors down the path of imprudence and
thus foster the tragedies that attend the disintegration of personal estates.
Finally, it would be urged that a contract is a contract, and a creditor who
gave fair consideration to his debtor is entitled to the promised return, even if
he is required to wait for its receipt.
There are other considerations, however, which are likely to prompt us to
accept discharges in some circumstances. For example, we must recognize that

some debts are simply uncollectible. The clearest case is one in which the
productive capacity of a wage earner is destroyed by a debilitating illness or
other tragedy that forces the individual to rely upon state support or private
largesse for his continued existence. Obligations may have been accumulated
that both the debtor and creditor assumed would be paid out of future earnings. Here the notion of the efficiency of the bankruptcy remedy again comes
into play. Rather than require each individual creditor to pursue a costly investigation to discover that his claim is uncollectible, we can use the bankruptcy system to establish that fact by a single inquiry. The granting of discharge will also foreclose vindictive or otherwise unnecessary collection
actions.
From this clear case we will want to shift our attention to other situations
in which arguments can still be made that it is appropriate to reach a final
resolution of creditors' claims. Some cases will benefit from the efficiencies
identified above. Many debts may be otherwise collectible, but the costs of private collection may exceed the anticipated return. Here the bankruptcy process may provide the creditor with some return and produce the discharge
which would have occurred in any event.
Other situations will require a much different focus. At some point we will
want to examine the theory of the fresh start, which encourages liberal dispensations from prior debts. The notion of giving the overextended but honest debtor a second chance is fundamental to our existing system and has
prompted new proposals for further reforms to improve the debtor's postbankruptcy position.' While the fresh-start doctrine in our existing system
3.

Among the reforms that appear to be intended to enhance the debtor's fresh start are
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seems to be buoyed primarily by humanitarian concerns, we might want to
inquire whether there is not also some economic justification for liberalized
access to bankruptcy discharges. The point to be investigated is whether excessive debt, with its attendant pressure on family and emotional stability and
job security, does not so inhibit productivity that there would be a net social
gain from terminating costly collection actions, excusing the debts, and giving
the poorer-but-wiser debtor a second chance.
As we move from the cases of uncollectible debts, in which bankruptcy
serves a cost-saving function, to the cases in which we investigate its effects on
productivity, the debate about the wisdom of discharges will intensify appreciably. For the present it is enough to suggest that we have crossed the
threshold of the discharge question and established that nondischargeability is
not an inviolable concept.
Those who would urge that the discharge in bankruptcy violates the basic
sanctity of contract must also be prepared to deal with an extensive body of
nonbankruptcy law that weighs against that position. Bankruptcy is not the
only context in which the dischargeability of obligations is recognized. Indeed,
the general law of contracts accepts that there are circumstances in which a
party may be excused from commitments that otherwise have all the attributes
of a valid contract. Decisions in this area were first categorized under the
doctrine of impossibility, which in its early formulations authorized a court to
discharge a contractual obligation if performance had been rendered impossible, provided that the court found that the promisor had not assumed the
particular risk and that he was not the cause of the circumstances which prevented performance. A leading case in this area is the 1863 English decision
in Taylor v. Caldwell.4 Taylor contracted to rent Caldwell's music hall for a
future date. Taylor planned to stage a musical event and, of course, anticipated making a profit by charging admission. Before the agreed-upon date,
the hall was destroyed by fire. When Taylor later sued for the damages which
resulted from Caldwell's failure to perform, the court concluded that there
was no liability. In the court's view Caldwell's duty to deliver the hall was by
implication conditional upon its continued existence. As that condition was
not satisfied, Caldwell was discharged from his contract.
Since the time of Taylor v. Caldwell the trend has been toward increasing
liberalization of the grounds for excuse. One important development in this
area was the adoption of section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which shifts the emphasis in sale-of-goods contracts from a requirement of
objective impossibility to a standard that requires a showing that "performance . . .has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the
those which prohibit postbankruptcy reaffirmations, invalidate a debtor's attempt to waive his
exemptions, and further restrict the classes of nondischargeable debts.
4. 3 Best & Sm. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309.
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non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made ...."
On the surface it might appear that many debtors who come to the bankruptcy court would otherwise be entitled to a discharge under these principles. Not infrequently the precipitating cause of bankruptcy is major illness or
other catastrophe that destroys the debtor's income. Could it not be said that
the occurrence of these unexpected events made it impossible for the debtor
to perform according to the original terms of his credit contracts? In the same
vein, wasn't the debtor's continued earning capacity a basic assumption on
which the contract was made? Whatever the appeal of this analysis, it is not
generally recognized in the cases applying the impossibility doctrine. We can
find authoritative statements to the effect that personal insolvency, whatever
the cause, does not discharge performance under a contract, whether the
5
agreement calls for the payment of money or some other type of exchange.
Many older cases suggest that the intervening conditions must indicate "objective impossibility," which is to say it must be shown that no person could have
6
rendered the required performance.
Much is troubling about the defense of impossibility. One might wonder
whether Taylor v. Caldwell would have been decided the same way if it had
arisen in an economic setting in which sophisticated forms of business interruption insurance were available to landlords who rented music halls. But
even if we choose not to question the origins of the doctrine, it is not at all
clear that we must accept that the distinction between insolvency and other
types of impossibility is inevitable. Some suggest that the distinction represents
a policy decision that a contrary result would encourage personal irresponsibility. 7 But that is hardly compelling in cases in which the insolvency is precipitated by such external causes as an illness or economic recession. 8
II
PROPOSED REFORMS

As suggested at the outset, the preceding paragraphs are attempts to settle
some preliminary matters that bear on our discussion of modern bankruptcy
systems. I have suggested that we should not be long detained by the question
5. Cases bearing on this question are collected and discussed in 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
1332 (1962).
6. See id., especially n. 64. See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 455 (1932).
7. 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1332 (1962).
8. 1 believe that there may be an entirely different explanation for the insolvency exception.
Much of the law on impossibility evolved during the period when governments were establishing
a separate institutional framework for dealing with insolvency problems. Courts considering private contract litigation in which insolvency was raised as a defense may well have concluded that
they should defer to those legal mechanisms specifically designated to effectuate the settlement of
debts.
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whether we should have a bankruptcy mechanism and that we can probably
agree that our system should grant discharges in some instances. With those
matters aside, we can begin talking more specifically about the operational
aspects of our system.

Many questions might be considered. A reading of the congressional hearings on the present proposals for bankruptcy reform indicates that there is a
good deal of debate about the structural and procedural aspects of bankruptcy. Should we remove substantial portions of the bankruptcy process
from the judicial system and place them in an administrative agency? Should
we guarantee bankrupts access to independent legal assistance? Should we
undertake to counsel debtors about the availability and consequences of various bankruptcy remedies? Those are interesting questions, but there are other
issues that are more germane to Dean Meckling's paper. I would like to focus
on the subset of issues that relate to the quality of the discharges received by
noncorporate debtors. Here I intend to refer not only to the specific rules
that deny a discharge to particular debtors but also to the rules that define
the type of debts which will be cleansed in bankruptcy, insure the effectiveness of the discharge, and limit the availability of subsequent discharges.
The present proposals for reform include various rules that define the
extent to which the debtor's discharge will be meaningful. Some deal with
the conditions under which discharges will be denied. Thus, as Dean Meckling notes, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
proposed that fraud in a financial statement made by a consumer-debtor to
a creditor not be a basis for denying the dischargeability of the obligations
incurred. 9 The Commission also endorsed the present practice of denying
the dischargeability of certain debts, although the classes of such debts are
modified somewhat under the Commission's proposal. The Commission's rules
defining the exceptions to discharge presumably represent a judgment that
the claims of certain types of creditors are sufficiently worthy to warrant
preference over the general goal of giving the debtor a fresh start. Among
the debts which would not be dischargeable under the Commission's proposals are certain tax liabilities, child support and alimony obligations, and
liabilities for embezzlement, larceny, and willful and malicious torts. One of
the more controversial classes of nondischargeable debts covers educational
debts, specifically those which were first due within the five years prior to
bankruptcy. Under the Commission's proposal the discharge may be allowed,
however, if it is established that repayment would impose undue hardship on
the debtor. 10
9. The proposals discussed here are outlined in

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

ON THE BANK-

H.R. Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, §§ 4-503,
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STATES,

RUPTCY REPORT].

10.

Interestingly, this is one of the few areas in which the availability of the bankruptcy

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 41 : No. 4

Other Commission proposals affect the debtor's discharge in a somewhat
less direct fashion. For example, one important provision is intended to preclude creditors from coercing debtors to relinquish the benefits of discharge
after bankruptcy. Thus, the Commission would provide that a debt discharged in bankruptcy cannot be revived or reaffirmed after bankruptcy, a
practice that is currently common in some types of consumer transactions.
Another rule worthy of note defines the frequency with which a debtor can
claim discharges in bankruptcy. The present law prohibits the debtor from
securing a new discharge if he has received a discharge in the previous six
years. The Commission proposes two important changes: The six-year limit is
reduced to five, and a new discharge will be allowed in a shorter period if it is
found that the debtor's new financial difficulties were caused by circumstances
beyond his control and that repayment would impose undue hardship."
In an effort to increase the effectiveness of the debtor's fresh start, the
Commission also proposes changes in the exemption rules that, for many
debtors, will increase the portion of their estates that they retain after
bankruptcy. In addition to setting the amounts that can be exempted for residences, burial plots, household furniture, and similar tangible property, the
Commission proposals include a provision that is designed to give a debtor
access to cash and similar assets to assist his fresh start. Thus, a debtor would
retain up to $500 in cash, securities, and receivables, including income tax
refunds. The reforms would also invalidate agreements that the debtor made
with respect to his exempt assets prior to bankruptcy: a voluntary waiver of
an exemption in favor of an unsecured creditor would be unenforceable. In
addition, the proposals would invalidate certain types of security interests that
a debtor has granted in his property. The consensual liens that are abrogated
are nonpurchase money security interests in wearing apparel, household
goods, and health aids.
III
EVALUATING THE REFORMS

As legislators are called upon to evaluate these various proposals, what
should their frame of reference be? Dean Meckling would urge them to consider the economic impact of the reforms. But as the conclusion to the first
part of his paper recognizes, they should also weigh carefully the humanitarian concerns that are involved. There are several important points to be
made about the balancing that will be undertaken. A perusal of the congressional hearings that have already been held suggests that some legislators asremedy is based on a calculation of the debtor's wealth that takes account of his human capital. If
we applied such a standard more generally, we would, I believe, eliminate many of the cases
which are seen as abuses of the bankruptcy system.
11. See note 10 supra.
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sume that many of the reforms will indeed transfer wealth from creditors to
their debtors. In candor I must indicate that I have not found an explicit
statement to this effect. But the questions that are asked often suggest that
this is the premise upon which the inquiry is made. For example, when representatives of the consumer finance companies raised objections to various
proposals that would affect their operation, particularly the provisions dealing
with false financial statements and postbankruptcy reaffirmations, the investigators undertook to establish that the finance companies had tremendous
assets, that they were very profitable, and that bankruptcy writeoffs were a
"minuscule" part of their total wealth. 12 This implies that the companies could
easily absorb the losses that the new measures would generate. Dean Meckling
makes clear that the critical issue is different: How will the finance companies
redistribute the costs imposed on them? In sum, the code of Robin Hood may
have limited utility for gauging the impact of the reforms.
A.

Are Reforms Comparable to Limitations on Right to Contract?

We do, however, need to examine Dean Meckling's ultimate conclusions a
bit more closely. In his summary he accepts the wisdom of the state's decision
to limit a debtor's right to bargain away his personal freedom and bodily integrity as security for his debts: "Those kinds of limitations probably raise the
cost of lending a little and may force some borrowers into extralegal markets,
but the overall effect is probably negligible."'1 3 But Dean Meckling is much
less tolerant of other limitations the state imposes on a debtor's right to grant
other claims on his labor income. He concludes that these "will significantly increase borrowing costs" and ultimately transfer wealth from responsible debtors to bankrupts. 4 The difficulty in this analysis is apparent, I believe. The fact of the matter is that we simply do not know whether the costs
of additional limitations are significant. The first part of Dean Meckling's conclusion accepts that there are some types of freedom that we will not allow the
debtor to bargain away in his credit contract. We believe that the values involved are of such a high order, and the costs sufficiently low, that on balance
intrusion by the state is proper. However, as to the other limitations that bankruptcy imposes on the credit contract, we do not know how they fare in this
equation. Until we begin to identify what the costs are, I believe we have to
be more cautious in our conclusion about their desirability.
Many of the consumer advocates involved in the move toward bankruptcy
reform believe that certain of the new proposals should be viewed in precisely
the same light as a prohibition on imprisonment. They feel that the human
values involved are of the same high order: just as the state should protect
12.
13.
14.

See, e.g., 1975-76 Bankruptcy Hearings, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 913-17.
Meckling, supra note 2, at 29.
Id.
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debtors from physical harassment, it should limit creditors' capacity to intrude
on a debtor's basic emotional well-being. A debtor's relationship with his
spouse and children, his right to continued employment, indeed his basic
self-respect, are thought to be at stake if the state does not provide him with
adequate exemptions, prohibit postbankruptcy reaffirmation, and so on. And
the supporters of these measures would likely deal with the cost issue in the
same terms that Dean Meckling applies to the ban on imprisonment. They
will contend that the costs are negligible and in any case greatly outweighed
by the human values that are at stake. There are many difficulties with this
analysis, of course. I believe that we are often too willing to blame creditors
for personal problems that have a much more basic source. But more germane to the present discussion is the point that, again, we simply cannot say
whether the costs are significant or negligible. We have some hunches about
what costs are involved and about the consequences of spreading them among
particular groups, but our calculations in this area are almost always predetermined by the philosophical premises from which we proceed.
I do not propose that we shrug off the cost question with a "don't know,
can't tell" attitude. Dean Meckling's paper is quite valuable in suggesting that
those involved in bankruptcy reform often ask the wrong questions. The
issue of the costs of the bankruptcy has received surprisingly little consideration to date despite the extensive attention given to the proposals for reform.
There is a pervading tendency to praise or condemn particular provisions
without any evidence of what the real effects will be. Perhaps the most optimistic thing that can be said at this point is that there is still time to remedy
this situation. We can set out to identify more specifically the reasons why we
might want to abate the process of reform in order to give more attention to
the matter of costs.
B.

What Will the Reforms Cost?

Many of the reforms proposed for noncorporate bankruptcies have the
same flavor as other recent efforts to increase governmental control of the
consumer credit market. Some of the studies of these other regulations
suggest that Dean Meckling's concern for the magnitude of the costs may be
well founded. The Benston study cited in Dean Meckling's paper is a case in
point. 15 One can find commentators who contend that finance companies are
guilty of extending "too much" credit to consumers and that the government
should protect us from this practice. One problem with that view-apart from
the error of its premise-is that indirect controls restricting the terms of credit
contracts are likely to cut with a broad blade. As Benston's findings suggest,
the group excluded from the credit market may include many who are appar15.

Benston, The Impact of Maturity Regulation on High Interest Rate Lenders and Borrowers. 4 J.
reprinted in LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1977, at 180.
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ently quite able to bear the obligations incurred and who presumably take a
different view of the utility of the transactions. In a similar vein, those who
have looked at the Arkansas experience in limiting interest rates to ten percent have found that consumers experienced untold "benefits" from this effort to legislate cheap credit: many creditors left or refused to enter the Arkansas market, retail prices (where the stores served as creditors) rose, and
the business activity in the border towns of adjoining states perked up.6
These results are hardly surprising in light of other findings which suggest
that the creditor's cost for short-term, small loans may reach as high as twenty
1 7
percent of the principal amount.
Recent efforts to abolish the holder-in-due-course rule have prompted
similar inquiries into costs. Our accumulated knowledge about this particular
reform is still quite imperfect, but we know enough to confirm that legislators
have been too casual in the past in dealing with the cost question. An extensive study of credit markets in Puerto Rico indicates that after the abolition of
the holder-in-due-course rule, the median rejection rate of applications for
used-car credit among commercial banks reached 100%-that is, the majority
of banks refused to write these sorts of loans. 8 While the rejection rate apparently was high before the reform became effective, the new law clearly had
an effect. The study report states that "forty percent of the respondents
[commercial banks] claimed that the abolition of [the holder-in-due-course
rule] has made them more selective in the purchase of consumer paper. One
large respondent claimed to have stopped financing used cars, while another
claimed a 20% reduction in purchased paper activity ....",9
Other studies are useful for their suggestions that we ought to be concerned about the ripple effect of consumer protection measures. In 1976 the
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc., (EFA) attempted to forecast the impact of the FTC's efforts to abolish the holder-in-due-course rule in
consumer transactions. Their primary concern was with the effect of the rule
on consumer purchases of new cars, household goods, mobile homes, and
home improvements. The original forecast was that the FTC rule might reduce the amount of consumer credit otherwise available by $2.2 billion in
1976 and reduce the GNP by $1 billion to $2 billion.2" The Wharton EFA has
been careful to point out that these figures must be approached with great
16. See, e.g., Blades & Lynch, Credit Policies and Store Locations in Arkansas Border Cities:
Merchant Reactions to a 10 Per Cent Finance Charge Ceiling (Credit Research Center, Purdue
University 1976); Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Arkansas Case, [1968] U. ILL.

L. F. 592.
17. PUERTO Rico DEVELOPMENT GROUP, CONSUMER CREDIT IN PUERTO Rico 128-30 (1975).
18. Id. at 1-23.
19. Id. at 128.
20. See Holder inDue Course: Does the Consumer Pay?, 32 Bus. LAW. 591, 621-24 (1977) (panel
discussion: remarks of Dr. James F. Smith, Senior Economist, Division of Research and Statistics
of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System.)
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caution. A postforecast inquiry did not confirm these forecasts. I gather that
because of the level of aggregation, it is extremely difficult-and expensive-to arrive at reliable conclusions about the consequences of a particular
regulation.

21

The difficulty of securing data of the sort considered above can have interesting effects on the legislative process. For those who begin from the premise that additional regulation will benefit consumers, the difficulty may be
seen as a reason for dismissing the cost issue. Some may even acquire new
boldness in pursuing a predilection toward reform, knowing that the risk of
contradiction is slight. Another danger of a different sort is that legislators, in
their search for certainty, will focus on the data to which there is the most
ready access and become insensitive to the question of its relevance. It may be
this sort of phenomenon which produces accusatory inquiries about the profitability of the consumer finance industry. In any event, I do not have the
impression that the very real informational problems in the consumer credit
area have led to more cautious decisionmaking.
C.

Who Bears the Costs?

As a part of the process of evaluating the costs of bankruptcy, we will want
to give close attention to the question who bears those costs. Dean Meckling
22
gives a succinct statement of how increased costs will be allocated:
The extent to which specific borrowers or a specific group of borrowers in
the consumer loan market bear the increased costs of reducing bad-debt losses
depends on the cost to financial institutions of sorting potential borrowers on
the basis of the bad-debt losses they are likely to cause .... The cheaper it is

to identify potential bankrupts, the narrower the base will be on which the
increased costs of bankruptcy are imposed.

For purposes of legislative policymaking it would seem important to determine what the cost-spreading behavior of particular creditors would be. Indeed, before one can decide that the costs of reform are not excessive, one
would presumably need to know which classes of borrowers would bear the
costs and then judge whether they could afford them. It seems to me to make
a fundamental difference whether the burdens of consumer-bankruptcy reform fall upon all users of the credit system, all nonbusiness debtors, only the
near-poor, or worse yet, all certain bankrupts.
While we again must generally register a "don't know" response, some of
the structural aspects of the credit markets suggest that many costs will be
allocated to less affluent groups. For example, consumer finance companies
are the object of many of the present reform proposals. The proposals to
21. Letter from Richard M. Young, Quarterly Model Project Director, Wharton EFA., Inc.
(March 9, 1977).
22. Meckling, supra note 2, at 23.
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limit reaffirmation of debts, to invalidate nonpurchase money security interests in household goods, and to remove the nondischargeability penalty for
false financial statements respond to practices that are common among such
firms. But consumer finance companies do not service a representative sample of consumer-borrowers. There are differences in income levels of
those who borrow from commercial banks and those who rely on finance
companies as a source of credit."z Consumer finance clientele includes greatly
disproportionate numbers of high-risk borrowers. Given that income level
can probably predict the likelihood of bankruptcy, the firms would seem to
have the capacity to make further differentiation on the basis of the degree of
bankruptcy risk. And the greater the firms' capacity to distinquish probable
bankrupts, the more they will allocate the costs to those least able to bear
them.
Not all persons share the view that bankruptcy costs may be allocated disproportionately among various classes of debtors. The transcript of the bankruptcy hearings includes an exchange between Kenneth N. Klee, Associate
Counsel of the House committee that conducted the inquiry, and Professor
Marjorie Girth, coauthor of the immensely useful Brookings study2 4 of the
25
bankruptcy process:
Mr. Klee: If bankruptcy filings increase, the reaction of finance companies
would be to increase the interest rate to spread the risk across the credit
economy. Why should honest consumers be forced to bear the increased costs
of credit by default of another person?
Professor Girth: I think all of us, or almost all of us, now are credit users,
Mr. Klee. If you think of us all as somewhat vulnerable to the unanticipated
crisis which produces most bankruptcy, then any increased cost is more like
insurance against our being the one who needs the service.
I personally am much less certain that the costs will be spread across the
whole credit economy or that all of us will pay the same premium.
D.

Should the Bankruptcy System Preempt the Welfare System?

There is another aspect of the cost-spreading issue which deserves our
attention. Assume that our legislators decide that they want rather costly reforms but also want to insure that less affluent credit users do not bear a
disproportionate part of the burden that would be imposed. What mechanisms could be used to secure better distribution of the costs? A number of
devices might be considered, but the broadest possible spread would probably be achieved through the tax base. The government might use its rev-
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enues to make grants to reduce the losses that creditors sustain. All taxpayers
would of course contribute to these grants and thus bear a portion of the costs.
Let us consider other arguments that give this suggestion some plausibility.
The provisions of the law that define exempt property offer a useful area for
inquiry. As has already been mentioned, the new proposals address the question of the amount and types of property that will be exempt from the claims
that creditors file in bankruptcy. The Commission's bill, for example, not only
states what exemptions will be given but also includes various provisions that
26
are intended to insure that debtors get the benefit of their exemptions.
Thus, it is provided that bankruptcy will not recognize any agreement in
which the debtor waives his exemptions and will not enforce certain types of
security interests in selected classes of goods. The purpose of the exemption
provision is presumably related to the general goal of giving a debtor a fresh
start. It defines the assets which a debtor will be able to take with him when
he begins his new venture.
We could select any of a number of exemption provisions to examine the
arguments in favor of an expanded governmental role, but one provides a
particularly useful example. In addition to property that may come under one
of the other exemption provisions, a debtor would be allowed to retain up to
$500 in "cash, securities, and receivables, including unpaid personal earnings,
accrued vacation pay, and income tax refund ....,,27 Most of these are highly
liquid assets, and I gather that the drafters of the measure have concluded
that it is desirable for a debtor to have a little cash (or something close to that)
to get him going again. And at least within the confines of the fresh-start
philosophy, this seems like a good idea. The debtor has just been through a
series of traumatic financial experiences in which he has probably lost some
assets and in addition may have deferred expenditures that would greatly benefit himself or his dependents. Moreover, he may still be feeling the effects of
some specific catastrophe-illness, loss of job, or whatever-which precipitated
the bankruptcy. Again, the liquidity exemption will help him get through the
adjustment period.
But at some point we have to stop and ask the question, Who is paying the
bill? If it is other less affluent credit consumers, we might be troubled. The
rationale for the transfer that is being made is similar to that which underlies
many public welfare programs. The individual finds himself in a disadvantageous financial position, often precipitated by a personal catastrophe or
general economic conditions, and it is thought appropriate that others chip in
to improve his circumstances. The difference, of course, is that these other
types of grants are financed by public revenues. If government financing is
proper in those cases, why is it not also desirable for the liquidity we provide
26.
27.
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to bankrupts? Surely there is little doubt whether the government or the less
affluent consumer is better able to absorb these costs.
But if we put the issue of exemptions in these terms, we might want to
examine some other questions. First, do the exemption provisions represent a
logically designed welfare program? It would appear that the class of recipients is at the same time both underinclusive and overinclusive. On the one
hand, it fails to reach all persons who are in serious financial difficulty, for
many-and perhaps most-of these never get into the bankruptcy system. On
the other hand, it includes persons who do not particularly need further assistance once the major impediment to their financial stability-their debtshas been eliminated. The persons in this group include those who earn
adequate incomes and are fully capable of meeting their recently reduced
current expenses.2" While I appreciate that there may be a heated debate
about how large this group is, I would suggest that we would not operate a
program of outright public grants that included them. 29 The second question
is perhaps more basic: Why should we not rely upon our general programs of
public assistance to provide for the truly desperate individuals who appear in
bankruptcy court? While I have fundamental objections to our present approach to welfare, existing programs at least employ somewhat more rational
criteria for identifying need than those which are used to determine access to
the bankruptcy process. If someone who is bankrupt can establish that he
qualifies under the existing arrangements, benefits are available. But the fact
of bankruptcy is not enough in itself. As for the future, it seems sensible to
address the question of welfare reform directly and not complicate the problem with further haphazard responses.

28. See note 10 supra.
29. Another problem with the exemptions is that a debtor's access to them is not based strictly
on need, but rather on whether he owns assets of the type identified in the various statutory
categories. This feature can have a marked discriminatory effect. Imagine a debtor who has

foregone opportunities to purchase a home, expensive personal effects, and the like in order to
finance a business venture. In the event of bankruptcy he will have very little with which to make
his fresh start, even if he has acquired some equity in his business assets. Yet his need may be as
great as that of another debtor who chose to invest in a residence, household furnishings, and
other assets within the categories of exemptions.

Further discrimination results from differences in the information that debtors have about how
the exemptions operate. Most debtors are probably honest-some would say ill informed-and the
mix of assets at bankruptcy reflects no conscious effort to take advantage of the exemptions.
However, some clearly take a different approach. One of the more interesting sessions in the
1975-76 bankruptcy hearings touched on this problem. The issue was whether it was proper for
debtors to convert their assets from nonexempt property to exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy. Two bankruptcy judges expressed the views that such conduct was "outrageous," that it
"shocks one's conscience," and that it was tantamount to fraud. 1975-76 Bankruptcy Hearings, supra
note 1, pt. 3, at 1357, 1356. An attorney with a large debtor clientele expressed a different view.
He suggested that he would be susceptible to a suit for malpractice if he did not counsel his
clients to make such conversions. He also thought that the practice was desirable, because it gave

meaning to the concept of a fresh start. Id. at 1351, 1350-58.
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CONCLUSION

As the foregoing would indicate, I do not see compelling reasons for public subsidization of transfers such as those attempted in the proposed bankruptcy revisions.3 0 Neither am I warmed by the thought that these might be
paid for by a narrow class of debtors. There is another option, but it is clear
to me that it will not be discussed until the point of Dean Meckling's paper
gains wider appreciation.
Some may make the point that we currently have scant evidence that the
less affluent, rather than all, credit users will bear the costs of bankruptcy or
that those costs are significant. As earlier indicated, I concede the correctness
of that proposition. However, I think we should recognize why there is no
evidence. The reason, of course, is that the question has not been asked, at
least not in a systematic fashion. To the extent that our bankruptcy policy is
shaped without regard to the costs and without concern for who will bear
them, its impact is going to be, at a minimum, uncertain and, at worst, unexpected. It seems to me we can do better.
30. Because I dismiss the notion of governmental subsidies for other reasons, I have not
addressed the question of how such grants might affect the respective incentives of creditors and
debtors. Large subsidies coupled with reduced exemptions presumably would cause creditors to
make loans to persons who could not otherwise afford them. Whether small grants would have
any significant effect is less certain. Other issues arise when we look at the debtor's incentives. If
we subsidize the debtor, we may encourage him to go through bankruptcy in situations in which
he otherwise would not. But don't the present exemptions already have that effect? If we could
somehow use the subsidies to offset existing exemptions dollar for dollar, there might be little

change in the debtor's attitude towards bankruptcy.

